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Advances in medical treatments, technology, and civil rights policy 
have created optimism that people with disabilities will increasingly 
become a part of the labor force. Yet that optimism has not yielded 
measurable outcomes in the employment rate of people with disabili 
ties, which has consistently ranged between 23 percent and 45 percent, 
depending on the definitions of "employment" and of "disability" used. 
In addition, the number of people entering the Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) rolls has 
increased notably in the last decade, from 4.2 million in 1985 to 11 
million in 1996. The percentage of those leaving the rolls for the pur 
pose of returning to employment persistently remains less than 1 per 
cent.
Puzzled by this seeming contradiction between the improvements 
that should lead to increases in employment for people with disabilities 
and the steady increase on the SSI/DI rolls, the Social Security Admin 
istration (SSA) set about to examine why the return-to-work rate (or 
the rate of entering the workforce for the first time) is so low for bene 
ficiaries with disabilities. We reviewed the literature, talked to the 
experts, and dedicated ourselves to hearing from beneficiaries them 
selves about the obstacles they face when they consider returning to 
work. The following is a summary of what we learned.
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HIGH RISK OF LOSING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE
When people with disabilities become SSI beneficiaries, they gener 
ally become Medicaid beneficiaries as well. After two years, DI benefi 
ciaries are eligible for Medicare. In general, loss of cash benefits may 
eventually lead to loss of health insurance as beneficiaries increase 
work earnings, even though they may not have improved medically. 
Between 1988 and 1992, the number of uninsured people grew by five 
million people in the United States. In addition, limits on employer- 
based health coverage for chronic conditions expanded. People with 
disabilities may find it difficult to access private health insurance 
because of preexisting condition exclusions and waiting periods 
imposed by carriers. Some people with disabilities need part-time 
employment due to limitations imposed by their disabilities. Part-time 
employment is rarely accompanied by health insurance benefits. Some 
people with disabilities need personal assistance services, which in 
many states are covered only by Medicaid. Thus, even if beneficiaries 
were to replace their public health insurance with private health insur 
ance, they would not likely receive coverage for all the services they 
need.
In a survey of more than 1,200 disability leaders from every state, 
the President's Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities 
(1994) found that loss of Medicare and Medicaid was perhaps the sin 
gle greatest barrier to employment. Another survey of disability pro 
gram applicants found that 75 percent of DI applicants and 79 percent 
of SSI applicants considered continued medical coverage as key to 
encouraging work.
Several work incentives address this problem. DI beneficiaries can 
continue Medicare coverage for at least 39 months following a trial 
work period and purchase Medicare after that time. SSI recipients can 
continue receiving Medicaid coverage up to a state-determined income 
ceiling after their earnings become too high for them to be eligible for 
cash payments. For example, in 1994 the cutoff point was $17,480 in 
Pennsylvania.
These work incentives do not appear to have a significant impact on 
the return-to-work rate of a large number of beneficiaries. Beneficiaries 
are generally unaware of the provisions. One survey found that 80 per-
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cent of beneficiaries who returned to work were unaware of the incen 
tives at the time they did so (Hennessey and Muller 1996). When 
beneficiaries are aware of the incentives provisions, they rarely under 
stand them fully; the incentives are complex, with different provisions 
applying to SSI and DI. Social security claims representatives have a 
difficult time explaining them and are generally focused on establish 
ing the applicant's eligibility and inability to work rather than pursing 
return-to-work goals.
WORK THAT PAYS THE BILLS
Some people with disabilities have enormous disability-related 
expenses, such as assistive technology or personal assistance services, 
for which there is rarely a subsidy, tax credit, or insurance reimburse 
ment. Some people with disabilities require extra time to accomplish 
daily activities, which means they may have less time and energy avail 
able for work. Others may have recurring or cyclical health problems, 
such as mental illness or multiple sclerosis, that require flexible work 
situations enabling them to meet their intermittent disability-related 
needs. Finding employment that is responsive to these needs and that 
offers a living wage can be difficult.
In addition, people with disabilities are often less educated than peo 
ple without disabilities and thus tend to have lower-paying jobs. While 
people with disabilities who work have an average income that is 
higher than people with disabilities who do not work, people with dis 
abilities earn less than people without disabilities. One analysis found 
the average earned income of workers with disabilities in 1995 to be 
$15,556, while it was $24,667 for workers without disabilities (Yelin 
1996).
In addition to receiving cash benefits and health care, people with 
disabilities who have low incomes may be receiving other types of 
public subsidies, such as food stamps, housing assistance, and energy 
assistance. Returning to work may jeopardize the cash benefits, the 
health insurance benefits, and all addition benefits. The loss of cash, 
medical, and other benefits may total an irreplaceable loss to a low- 
skilled worker who is likely to be compensated at minimum wage.
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CUSTOMER CHOICE AND PROVIDER INCENTIVES 
FOR RETURN TO WORK
While most recipients of disability benefits are unlikely candidates 
for return-to-work programs, a significant percentage are. Thirty-five 
percent of DI beneficiaries responding to a 1993 questionnaire indi 
cated an interest in receiving return to work services (cited in U.S. 
General Accounting Office 1996). Demonstration projects conducted 
by SSA, such as Project Network, have enabled beneficiaries with 
vastly different impairments to return to work. Yet the current system 
yields few beneficiaries who do return to work.
The Social Security Act requires referral of disability applicants to 
state vocational rehabilitation (VR) agencies. On average, state Dis 
ability Determination Services offices refer about 8 percent of appli 
cants who are awarded benefits. Less than 10 percent of those referred 
are accepted by the VR agencies as clients. State VR agencies success 
fully rehabilitate about 1 out of every 1,000 beneficiaries each year 
(U.S. General Accounting Office 1996).
Because of the limited capacity and resources to serve all who may 
benefit from VR services, many state VR agencies limit the referrals 
they will accept to those they consider to be the best VR candidates. 
SSI or DI beneficiaries are often perceived as less appealing candidates 
because they may be seen as more difficult to rehabilitate. Although 
SSA pays VR agencies for rehabilitation costs of beneficiaries success 
fully employed for nine.months, the delay in payments and the risk 
accepted by the VR agency are often cited as disincentives to rehabili 
tate SSI/DI beneficiaries.
Customers assert that they know best which services would help 
them return to work. They dislike becoming involved with yet another 
government bureaucracy in order to access such services. Some need 
training that employers can best provide. Some need personal assis 
tance services or assistance with transportation. Customers want to 
choose the service provider that will enable them to design their own 
individualized rehabilitation services to meet their unique needs.
In 1996, SSA initiated a program to allow private rehabilitation pro 
viders to be reimbursed for serving SSI/DI beneficiaries when the state 
VR system does not serve them. SSA hopes that private providers will
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offer greater choice for beneficiaries who seek to return to work. They 
also invited state VR agencies to create performance partnerships. 
While only six agencies are participating, early results are promising.
YOUTH IN TRANSITION
The average age of SSI/DI recipients has decreased in recent years. 
As of 1994 about 4.2 percent of SSDI beneficiaries and 19.2 percent of 
SSI recipients were between the ages of 18 and 29. Today more than 
one million beneficiaries are younger than 22. Many who enter the 
rolls as children stay on the rolls through their adolescence and into 
adulthood. The proportion of beneficiaries with long-lasting impair 
ments, such as mental impairments, has increased in the last decade. 
Thus, many recipients are coming on the rolls earlier and staying 
longer.
DI, and to a lesser extent SSI, was originally constructed as an early 
retirement program. The programs are intended to replace cash income 
when a wage earner needs to retire before age 65. Therefore, in the eli 
gibility process, the focus is on the limitations of people needing to 
retire, not on their abilities. The programs were not designed for young 
people with significant impairments who nevertheless have ambitions 
and need to develop skills to achieve them. Too often they, and some 
times their families, may become dependent upon cash benefits that 
limit both their income and their potential. As the number of young 
people coming on the rolls increases and the length of stay increases, 
we must ask ourselves if a "retirement" model will best meet the needs, 
ambitions, and potential of so many of our nation's youth with disabil 
ities.
CONCLUSIONS
We believe the four key areas we have identified as obstacles to 
return to work for SSI/DI beneficiaries—access to health insurance 
(including personal assistance services), finding work that pays enough
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to live on, customer choice of return-to-work services, and the unique 
needs of youth—must be addressed if we are to improve our employ 
ment outcomes among beneficiaries. SSA is committed to supporting 
all beneficiaries who want to work. However, many of the obstacles 
people with disabilities encounter in seeking to work are beyond the 
scope of cash benefit policy and programs. Our nation's employment 
policy must accept and support people with disabilities as part of the 
American workforce, not as ancillary to it. SSA is working with other 
federal agencies to identify policy options that will remove employ 
ment obstacles encountered by our beneficiaries. Our customers have 
told us clearly that our federal return-to-work efforts need improve 
ment. We have heard them and we are moving forward with our federal 
partners seeking to address their concerns.
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